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We introduce new sophisticated attacks with a Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometer against quantum
key distribution (QKD) and propose a new QKD protocol grafted with random basis shuffling
to block up those attacks. When the polarization basis is randomly and independently shuffled
by sender and receiver, the new protocol can overcome the attacks even for not-so-weak coherent
pulses. We estimate the number of photons to guarantee the security of the protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk
A cryptography based on quantum mechanics has re-
ceived much attention since the seminal works on quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) by Bennett and Brassard
(BB84) [1] and Ekert [2]. Up to now, various QKD
protocols have been proposed [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] and ex-
perimentally realized [6, 9, 10]. Also their security was
continuously examined [1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12]. Recently, sin-
gle photon QKD [1] and entangled-state QKD [2] were
much studied because when one does not use a single
photon most protocols have their own serious security
holes against such eavesdropping attacks as photon num-
ber splitting (PNS) [13], intercept and resend (IAR) [14],
and impersonation attack [15]. However, single photon
QKD is not economical because it is difficult to have a
reliable single-photon source and also a photon can be
easily lost due to imperfect channel efficiency [16]. For
this reason, the development of a secure QKD protocol
with not-so weak coherent pulses is indispensable to real
communication.
Very recently, two new QKD protocols that use not-
so-weak coherent pulses (faint laser pulse) were proposed;
One is based on a two-way communication without en-
tanglement (LM protocol) [17] and the other a three-way
communication with blind polarization [18]. In the for-
mer, in brief, the user “Bob” prepares a qubit in one of
the four states of Pauli operators X and Z, and sends
it to his counterpart “Alice.” With probability c, Alice
measures the prepared state and, with probability 1− c,
she uses it to encode the message. She sends the qubit
back to Bob. Then Bob can deterministically decode Al-
ice’s message by measuring the qubit in the same basis
he prepared it.
In the latter, Alice sends two randomly and inde-
pendently polarized not-so-weak coherent pulses to Bob.
Bob rotates the polarization of pulses with another ran-
dom angle, shuffles it with ±pi4 or ∓
pi
4 , and sends back
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the pulses to Alice. Alice compensates her random an-
gles, encodes a key bit, and sends one of the pulses to
Bob after randomly blocking the other. Then Bob reads
the polarization of the return qubit after compensating
his random angle. When Alice publicly announces the
blocking factor, Bob recovers the key bit.
The security of the former protocol was examined in
a noisy channel against a spy pulse. And it was claimed
that the protocol is robust against the PNS attack be-
cause of a lack of symmetry in the photon states. In the
latter, the security of the random polarization was exam-
ined against the PNS and the IAR attacks. And though
it was expected that the shuffling and random blocking
would play a crucial role in enhancing security, the pro-
tocol turned out insecure, particularly against the imper-
sonation attack [19]. So Kye and Kim modified the pro-
tocol by randomly and independently shuffling the qubit
polarization with pi4 or −
pi
4 (KK protocol) [20].
However, we are still doubtful about the security of
both the LM and the KK protocols. To use them in prac-
tice, the security must be rigorously examined. So we
develop new sophisticated eavesdropping attacks using a
Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometer (HOMI) [21], which are
the most advanced ones against these type QKD proto-
cols. In this Letter, first, we introduce the new attacks
to show the security holes of the LM and the KK pro-
tocols. Next, we propose a new QKD protocol that uses
not-so-weak coherent pulses. Last, we prove the security
of our protocol against the attacks that we introduce.
We introduce the PNS attack with a HOMI to examine
the security of the LM protocol. The attack procedure is
like this. When a not-so-weak coherent pulse is used in
a lossy channel, an eavesdropper Eve replaces the lossy
channel with a perfect one and splits out photons from
the forward and the backward path. Then Eve measures
the interference between the split photons from both the
paths with a HOMI. If interference appears, the coding
is ”0”; if not, it is ”1.” Thus Eve obtains the key bit
regardless of the lack of symmetry.
For the security of the KK protocol, we now intro-
duce a new impersonation attack with a HOMI. When
2Eve has a HOMI in her superiority, she can easily attack
the protocol even though the shuffling method is modi-
fied to block up an impersonation attack. The procedure
is as follows: (1) Eve intercepts the two qubits |ψ1〉 =
|θ1〉⊗|θ2〉 from Alice to Bob, and stores them. Then Eve
prepares two highly coherent qubits |ψ′1〉 = |θ
′
1〉 ⊗ |θ
′
2〉,
and sends them to Bob. (2) When the qubits are back
from Bob, Eve compensates her random angles (let the
compensated qubits be |Ψ〉), splits out one photon from
both qubits of |Ψ〉 and measures the angle difference with
a HOMI. Because of the random and independent shuf-
fling ±pi4 , the qubits in |Ψ〉 are either parallel or orthog-
onal: if interference occurs, the two qubit states are par-
allel; if not, they are orthogonal. When they are parallel,
Eve applies Uˆy(
pi
4 ) ⊗ Uˆy(
pi
4 ) to |ψ1〉; if not, she applies
Uˆy(−
pi
4 )⊗ Uˆy(
pi
4 ). She sends the qubits to Alice. (3) Eve
measures the pre-key bit after intercepting the return
qubit from Alice, and estimates the key bit according to
the blocking factor. She applies the estimated key bit to
one of the qubits of |Ψ〉 depending on the blocking fac-
tor and sends the chosen qubit to Bob. (4) When Alice
publicly announces the blocking factor, Eve recovers the
key bit.
In this attack, let us consider the case that the two
qubits in |Ψ〉 are parallel. In (3), the qubit state, in
Eve’s measurement, is either |0〉 or |pi2 〉, since Eve ap-
plies Uˆy(
pi
4 ) ⊗ Uˆy(
pi
4 ) to |ψ1〉. Then Eve obtains the key
bit regardless of the blocking factor. After the measure-
ment, Eve applies Uˆy((−1)
k pi
4 ) to any of the qubits in
|Ψ〉 depending on her measurement, and sends it to Bob
without revealing her presence in the channel. When the
two qubits in |Ψ〉 are orthogonal, Zhang’s attack proto-
col [19] is valid. Thus Eve can attack the KK protocol
perfectly.
Protocol. — To block up the impersonation attack
with a HOMI and to use not-so-weak coherent pulses, we
adopt the basic idea of the BB84 protocol, which is to
use the four photon states of 0, pi2 , and ±
pi
4 polarization.
The four states can be written as (−1)s pi4 +{(−1)
r+1}pi8 ,
where s is the random polarization shuffling and r is the
random basis shuffling. Here the basis shuffling plays
a crucial role in blocking up the impersonation attack.
Our new protocol with random basis shuffling proceeds
as follows:
(P.1) Alice sends two qubits of |ψ1〉 = |θ1〉 ⊗ |θ2〉 ≡⊗2
b=1 |θb〉 to Bob.
(P.2) After receiving |ψ1〉, Bob applies a unitary opera-
tor
⊗2
b=1 Uˆy(φ + (−1)
sb pi
4 + {(−1)
rb + 1}pi8 ) where
sb = {0, 1} and rb = {0, 1} are the independent
random numbers to shuffle the photon state and
the polarization basis, respectively. He returns the
qubits |ψ2〉 to Alice.
(P.3) On receiving |ψ2〉, Alice applies
⊗2
b=1 Uˆy(−θb +
(−1)kb pi4 + {(−1)
pb + 1}pi8 ), where kb ∈ {0, 1} is
the key bit and pb ∈ {0, 1} is Alice’s basis shuffling
parameter. She block one of the qubits and sends
the other |ψ3〉 to Bob.
(P.4) When |ψ3〉 arrives, Bob compensates his random
angle with −φ, divides the qubit |ψ3〉 into two with
a 50 percent beam splitter, and measures each pre-
key bit on the | ± pi4 〉 and the |0〉 and
pi
2 〉 bases. He
stores the pre-key bit.
(P.5) After repeating the procedure from (M.1) to (M.4)
N -times, Alice publicly announces b and pb. Then
Bob decodes the original key bit.
(P.6) When Eve misses the key bit because of the divi-
sion of the return qubit, Bob publicly announces on
which turns qubits have been missed in measure-
ment. Then Alice and Bob repeat the procedure
from (M.1) to (M.5) for the missed key bit until
the full key bit stream is generated.
(P.7) In order to verify the integrity of the shared keys,
Alice and Bob evaluate the hash values, ha =
H(ka) and hb = H(kb), where ka and kb are Alice’s
and Bob’s shared keys, respectively. Then they ex-
change and compare them. If ha = hb, they keep
the shared keys, otherwise, they abolish the keys.
In this protocol, the efficiency of key distribution de-
pends on the number of photons of |ψ3〉. The efficiency is
1− 1/2n for an n-photon qubit. If one wants to increase
the efficiency, (s)he can slightly modify the protocol like
this. In (M.4) Bob stores the return qubit |ψ3〉 in a quan-
tum storage like a fiber and publicly announces to Alice
his reception of the qubit. Then when Alice announces
b and pb, Bob decodes the original key bit by measuring
the polarization of the stored qubit.
Now, we focus on the security against the imperson-
ation attack, since it was proved that a protocol using
random angle polarization is secure against the PNS and
the IAR attacks [18].
Attack-1. — We suppose that the superior Eve knows
the angle difference of the two qubits in |Ψ〉 and the pre-
key bit exactly. Then the attack procedure is as follows:
(A.1) After (P.1), Eve intercepts and stores |ψ1〉, and
sends |ψ′1〉 =
⊗2
b=1 |θ
′
b〉 to Bob.
(A.2) After (P.2), Eve intercepts |ψ′2〉 and compen-
sates her random angle with −θ′b. Then Eve has |Ψ〉 =⊗2
b=1 |(φ+ (−1)
sb pi
4 + {(−1)
rb + 1}pi8 )〉. Eve splits out a
few photons from both pulses of |Ψ〉 and stores the rest.
Then Eve measures the angle difference of the split pho-
tons with a HOMI. There are three cases of results: first,
on complete non-interference the angle difference of the
two pulses is pi2 ; second, on complete interference it is
0; and third, on partial interference it is pi/4. On each
case, Eve applies Uˆy(
pi
4 ) ⊗ Uˆy(−
pi
4 ), Uˆy(
pi
4 ) ⊗ Uˆy(
pi
4 ), and
Uˆy(
pi
4 )⊗ Uˆy(0) to |ψ1〉, respectively. And Eve sends |ψ
e
2〉
to Alice, where the superscript e implies Eve’s action to
Alice’s qubits.
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FIG. 1: The probability of Eve’s estimation depending on the
photon number: Line A is the pre-key bit estimation with the
use of POVM, and Line B is the angle difference and sequence
estimation with a HOMI.
(A.3) After (P.3), Eve measures the pre-key bit from
|ψe3〉, estimates Alice’s unitary operation depending on
b from the pre-key bit, chooses one qubit of |Ψ〉, and
applies the unitary operator that she has estimated.
In order to show the security of our new protocol, we
consider the case that Bob applies a unitary operator
Uˆy(φ) ⊗ Uˆy(φ +
pi
4 ). In (A.2), on receiving the qubits,
Eve compensates her random angles. Then the qubit
state becomes |Ψ〉 = |φ〉 ⊗ |φ + pi4 〉. Suppose that Eve
applies Uˆy(
pi
4 )⊗ Uˆy(0) to the qubits |ψ1〉 and returns the
qubits |ψe2〉 to Alice, since she does not know the sequence
of the qubits. She can measure only the angle difference
with a HOMI. Also suppose that, on receiving the qubits,
Alice compensates her random angles, blocks the second
qubit, rotates the first by pi4 , and sends the first to Bob.
Then the parameters of the qubit are b = 1, k1 = 0, and
p1 = 1. Eve intercepts the return qubit |ψ
e
3〉 and mea-
sures the polarization of the qubit that is pi2 . Here Eve
must estimate the rotation angle depending on b. When
Eve chooses b = 2, the rotation angle is pi2 . Then the
parameters that Eve estimates are k2 = 0 and p2 = 0.
Eve rotates the second qubit of |Ψ〉 by pi2 , and sends it to
Bob. Then Bob’s pre-key bit is | 34pi〉 = −
pi
4 〉. When Alice
announces b and pb, Bob recovers the key bit as k = 1.
When Eve chooses b = 1, Bob’s key bit is k = 0. Whether
the angle difference of the two qubits in |Ψ〉 is pi2 or 0,
there is no error, whatever the sequence of the qubits in
|Ψ〉 is. Bob’s wrong recovery is caused by Eve’s wrong
choice of the sequence when the polarization difference
between the two qubits in |Ψ〉 is pi4 . Owing to the possi-
bility of the pi4 angle difference, sequence mismatch, and
wrong choice of b, Bob’s error rate is 12.5 percent. This
means our new protocol is secure against Eve’s imperson-
ation attack, even when she knows the angle difference
between the two qubits in |Ψ〉 and the pre-key bit.
Attack-2. — When Eve knows not only the pre-key
bit but also the angle difference and the sequence of the
two qubits in |Ψ〉, she can recover the key bit completely
without Bob’s recognition. However, a measurement of
all of them is not easy in practice because of the lim-
ited number of photons. To estimate the number of
photons for the security of our new protocol, first, we
consider Eve’s attack on the pre-key bit with the posi-
tive operator-valued measurement (POVM) [22]. In this
measurement, when we consider one of the four photon
states and N identical copies of the state, we can obtain
the probability of Eve’s estimation of the pre-key bit de-
pending on the number of photons. According to ref.[22],
the probability is P (N)E = 1−(1/2)
[(N−1)/2], where [ · ]
is the rounding to the closest lower integer. Line A in Fig.
1 shows about 95 percent accuracy for N = 10.
Next, we consider Eve’s attack on the angle difference
and the sequence between the two qubits in |Ψ〉. Suppose
that Eve replaces the lossy second and third channels
with perfect ones and that she has perfect technology to
split a certain number of photons from both the qubits,
although this is far beyond today’s technology. Eve splits
out the same number of photons from both the qubits in
|Ψ〉 in consideration of the channel efficiency. She picks
out one photon from N photons split from the first qubit
(let it be T1 and the others T2), and picks out one photon
from N photons split from the second qubit (let it be R1
and the others R2). From the interference between T2
and R2, Eve measures the angle difference between the
two qubits in |Ψ〉 using the method in (A.2). When T2
and R2 give rise to partial interference, the angle differ-
ence is pi/4. Then Eve rotates T1 by pi/4 and measures
the interference between T1 and R1. When she observes
interference, the angle of the first qubit to the second
one is −pi4 , while with no-interference it is
pi
4 . Then Eve
knows the sequence of the qubits for the pi/4 angle dif-
ference. In the case of partial interference between T2
and R2, let us assume that j photons make interference
while N−1−j photons give rise to no interference. Then
the probability of Eve’s estimation for the partial inter-
ference is 12N−1
∑N−2
j=1
(
N−1
j
)
. For the other cases of com-
plete interference and no interference, Eve regards that
the photon states of T2 and R2 are parallel and orthog-
onal, respectively. Then Eve’s probability for the esti-
mation of the angle difference and the sequence of |Ψ〉 is
P (N)E =
1
2 +
1
2N
∑N−2
j=1
(
N−1
j
)
) because of the probabil-
ity of the pi/4 angle difference.
Line B in Fig. 1 is the probability of Eve’s estima-
tion for the angle difference and the sequence of the two
qubits in |Ψ〉 depending on the number of split photons.
When Eve splits out 5 photons from each qubit she can
measure both the angle difference and the sequence of
the two qubits with about 93 percent accuracy. Lines A
and B in Fig. 1 show that the estimation of the pre-key
bit of |ψe3〉 is less efficient than that of the angle difference
and the sequence of the two qubits in |Ψ〉, even when the
channel efficiency is considered. When we consider that
the qubits of |Ψ〉 are at Eve’s mercy, we can understand
4that most of the errors by Eve can occur in the measure-
ment of the pre-key bit due to the basis shuffling. So the
basis shuffling is decisive in blocking up Eve’s attack.
Attack-3. — Another instance of the impersonation at-
tack in our new protocol is the attack on b and the photon
state of |ψe3〉. In this attack, Eve applies Uˆy(
pi
8 ) ⊗ Uˆy(0)
to |ψ1〉 in (A.2) and sends |ψ
e
2〉 to Alice. Since Alice ap-
plies a key bit and basis shuffling, after she compensates
her random angle with −θb, the qubit state |ψ
e
3〉 in (A.3)
is one of the four states (1 + 2n)pi/8 for the first qubit
or one of the four states 2npi/8 for the second, where
n = 0, 1, 2, 3. Then by measuring the qubit state with
POVM, Eve can obtain b and k ⊕ pb. Depending on b,
Eve applies k⊕ pb to the b-th qubit of |Ψ〉 and sends the
qubit to Bob. When Alice publicly announces b and pb,
Eve recovers the key bit.
In this attack protocol, Eve should measure the return
qubit state with POVM among eight states. We can
intuitively understand that the photon state estimation
with POVM among eight states is less efficient than that
of among four states, since POVM for eight states needs
at least 7 photons [22]. The attack on the pre-key bit is
more serious than the attack on b. Eve can also attack
b by counting the number of photons of the two pulses
[19]. To block up this attack, in (P.3), the number of
the photons of the returning pulse should be randomly
reduced to be less than either of the photon numbers of
the two received pulses.
Attack-4. — Eve can add an invisible spy pulse, whose
wavelength is different from that of Alice’s qubits [23].
The removal of this spy pulse is so trivial when Alice
uses a commercial band-pass filter, a spectrometer, and
a Fabry-Perot interferometer. To block up this kind of
attack, the use of quasi-monochromatic photons is cru-
cial. For another instance, Eve can add a spy pulse with
time delay to the original qubits. Alice and Bob can eas-
ily remove this spy pulse with an optical switcher. Alice
and Bob can also recognize the spy pulse by randomly
measuring the pulse intensity.
In conclusion, we have shown that the LM and the KK
protocols are vulnerable to sophisticated eavestropping
attacks with a Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometer. The LM
protocol is insecure against the PNS attack with a HOMI
and the KK protocol against the impersonation attacks
with a HOMI. These atacks are effective to these pro-
tocols. To overcome these attacks, we have proposed a
new protocol with basis shuffling as an altenative. In the
three-way communication ptotocol, when both the po-
larization basis and the photon state are randomly and
independently shuffled, the protocol with random polar-
ization becomes robust against not only the PNS and
the IAR attacks but also the sophisticated impersonation
attacks with a HOMI, even with not-so-weak coherent
state pulses. As we have shown, the number of photons
of Alice’s qubits is very important in blocking up the
impersonation attacks. This new QKD protocol can be
applicable to real communication because of the merit of
robustness and the use of not-so-weak coherent pulses.
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